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While public attention is focused on the eurozone crisis, EU
Member States and the European Parliament are locked in a
struggle over reforming the Common Agricultural Policy.
by Blog Admin
Several attempts have been made to reform the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in
recent years. Christilla Roederer-Rynning writes that while previous CAP negotiations have
proven controversial, the latest attempt has largely been overshadowed by the on-going
eurozone crisis. Nevertheless, the current process is no less contentious, not least because
the increased powers granted to the European Parliament by the Lisbon Treaty have made
CAP reform a battleground between MEPs and Member States in the Council.
While media attention f or the last many months has f ocused on the management of  the
eurozone crisis and the ref orm of  f inancial institutions, the EU has quietly embarked on an internal round
of  negotiations on the ref orm of  its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the EU’s programme of  agricultural
aid and subsidies valued in 2011 at over €55 billion. This is the f if th broad CAP ref orm in two decades,
notwithstanding the more specif ic ref orms circumscribed to individual sectors like sugar or wine. As a rare
case of  an EU “money policy”, the CAP has generated a host of  vested interests that resist retrenchment,
it plays an invariably crucial role in the high polit ics of  EU budget ref orm, and it crystallizes contradictions
among member-states about what proper economic policy is. All these f actors explain why CAP ref orms
usually are controversial exercises. The lack of  public attention to CAP ref orm this t ime does not mean that
CAP ref orm is less controversial today, but simply that the economic issues at stake in the eurozone crisis
are on a dif f erent scale: the EU budget represents only 1 per cent of  EU national income, a f ar cry f rom
what a collapse of  the economy of  Mediterranean countries would cost Europeans.
Current CAP talks are intertwined with the multi-annual f inancial f ramework (MFF) negotiations def ining the
EU’s budget priorit ies f or 2014-2020. MFF are always a challenge f or the EU, which tends to approach
budget making rather like a medieval polit ical community. However, money being hard to come by in t imes of
economic hardship, the crisis naturally exacerbates these dif f icult ies. The European Commission, seeing in
the current polit ical and economic constellation a chance to “rationalize” the EU budget, strives to t ie EU
money to demonstrable contribution to high levels of  European added value and the f ulf ilment of  new EU
priorit ies, such as sustainable growth and employment, education, social inclusion, innovation, and climate
and energy.
In agriculture, the Commission proposes
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In agriculture, the Commission proposes
a “greening” of  EU money, meaning that
a signif icant share of  f arm payments is
made conditional upon the delivery of
green projects. EU heads of  state and
governments, as f ar as they are
concerned, keep warning against
signif icant increases in EU expenditure.
The CAP and cohesion policies are
designated targets f or budget cuts
when f unds must be f ound to support
new priorit ies. Faced with the real
possibility of  a shrinking CAP pie,
Agriculture Ministers have shown litt le
enthusiasm f or the Commission’s
“greening” idea and on the whole f ind it
dif f icult to develop a vision f or
tomorrow’s agricultural policy. Many new
EU members (especially the Baltic
countries) are unhappy with the f act that their f armers still only receive a f raction of  what f armers in older
member-states do. Redistributive conf licts between the CAP and other policies are thus compounded by
internal redistributive conf lict between old and (some) new members. There is not much new on this f ront:
2012 resembles 2002 (accession negotiations), the legacy of  which carries on.
On the other hand, the “EP-f actor” is a decidedly new f eature of  this CAP ref orm: the Lisbon Treaty
extending codecision (now called “ordinary legislative procedure”) to agriculture, which puts the European
Parliament (EP) on a par with the Council of  Ministers. This change illustrates a more general tendency in
the EU to empower the EP in areas where the Council of  Ministers rules by qualif ied-majority voting, on
grounds of  polit ical accountability. Even so, it was not self -evident in agriculture, which explains why
codecision came so late there.
Codecision has ambiguous implications. On the one hand, it af f ords greater openness and public scrutiny.
At the same time, it complicates the process; it gives the Commission less room f or manoeuvre in carrying
out ref orms; and it introduces additional veto points in the decision-making process. All these elements
may be expected to slow down CAP ref orm. In agriculture, the main winner of  codecision, given the
committee-driven character of  the legislative work in the EP, is Comagri, the EP committee dealing with
agriculture and rural development. As a f armer’s committee, Comagri is known f or advocating ever-greater
public support f or agriculture, though one might expect codecision to f oster changes as the burden of
responsibility sinks in and the prerogatives attached to codecision become clearer.
How, then, has this new institutional setting af f ected the CAP ref orm process until now? It has complicated
it, but not entirely or solely f or the reasons outlined above. Comagri has called f or the CAP budget to
remain constant in real terms and its members have tabled a record high number of  amendments to the
Commission proposals. Many of  them, it seems, bear the signature of  tradit ional f arm interests or national
delegations. This is not surprising given the size of  the CAP package, the novelty of  codecision, but also
the f act that the new procedures are delivering their ef f ects through structures of  the past. The EP
approaches the current CAP ref orm with a Comagri that is largely a ref lection of  pre-Lisbon polit ics: i.e.
representing f arm interests and being only slightly enhanced to f ace the additional administrative burden of
codecision. Whatever lessons EP polit ical groups learn f rom this CAP ref orm will be ref lected in the
composition of  the next Comagri. Presumably, it will be larger and more diversif ied. Increased power should
make this committee increasingly attractive f or MEPs with a broad range of  interests and concerns.
The current CAP ref orm is complicated f or yet another reason. This t ime, the “normal” polit ics of  CAP
ref orm is woven together with post-Lisbon constitutional polit ics. Treaties are rarely unambiguous, and the
uncertainties arising f rom these ambiguities are of ten resolved in the context of  ordinary policy-making (or
budget making), in a second, post-Treaty phase. The Lisbon Treaty provisions on the CAP are no
exceptions to this rule. Consequently, as the f irst big agricultural dossier subject to codecision, this CAP
ref orm is inf used with more polit ical signif icance than just the delivery of  a policy outcome; it will def ine a
path f or the concrete rules of  engagement between Council, EP, and Commission. This puts the EP and the
Council at loggerheads. Earlier this year, a Danish Council of  Ministers presidency paper summarizing the
MFF discussions on the basis of  “negotiating boxes” roused EP indignation: the negotiating box f or the
CAP provided policy detail, which the EP considered to be a trespassing on its codecision rights. At the
same time, the ef f orts by the Commission to settle the ambiguities of  the Lisbon Treaty via horizontal
legislation (subject to codecision) have run aground as a result of  irreconcilable Council and EP posit ions.
EP, Council, and Commission must now f ormulate an institutional compromise within the current CAP
ref orm process.
The CAP ref orm negotiations have entered a more active phase. In the EP, the polit ical work of
synthesizing more than 7,000 amendments has started with a view to f inding an agreement with the
Council, of f icially bef ore the end of  the year. The outcome will tell us not only where the CAP is headed, but
also how power is to be shared between Council, EP, and Commission. While nobody expects a radical
change on the f ormer point, the power game remains open-ended.
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Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.
Shortened URL for this post: http://bit .ly/CAPREF
 _________________________________
About the author
Christilla Roederer-Rynning – University of Southern Denmark
Christilla Roederer-Rynning is an Associate Prof essor in the Department of  Polit ical
Science and Public Management at the University of  Southern Denmark. Her research
interests include the role of  parliamentary actors in EU polit ics, the Common Agricultural
Policy, and the transnationalization of  interest groups and social movements.
